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Mobilizing the past: creuseurs, precarity and the
colonizing structure in the Congo Copperbelt
Timothy Makori
It was 2pm. The intense sun that afternoon made the fifteen-minute wait at the city
centre of Likasi in Haut-Katanga province of Congo all the more tedious for Papa
Kabongo, my research assistant, and me. We were waiting for some informants for
an interview and they had not appeared. Half an hour passed and we spotted two
brand-new Bajaj motorbikes whiz past us and turn around rather abruptly. The
riders were both without helmets but they wore some fancy sunglasses. The blue
bike came right up to me. The rider slowly lifted his glasses and with a cheeky
grin said, ‘Timoté, ni je?’ (‘Timoté, how is it?’). It was Francis, my informant. I
was perplexed, unsure of whether I should comment on his looks, that suspicious
grin, or the flippant greeting. Francis knew and could see that I looked visibly sur-
prised because, only the day before, Papa Kabongo and I had stumbled into him in
an artisanal mine near the city of Likasi where I was conducting my fieldwork.
Then, he wore shorts soiled with mud and a tired T-shirt browned by dust and
spoke to us about the Sunday meeting while standing knee-deep in brown
murky water while overseeing his copper ore being washed. At one moment, he
would be speaking calmly to us and at the next he would be flailing his arms
and hollering at some teenage boys at the nearby stream to hurry up with the
rinsing of his malachite rocks. Francis was a creuseur.
That Sunday afternoon when I met him one might have mistaken him for a
sapeur.1 He had donned a Yankees baseball cap, aviator sunglasses, blue jeans,
a Chelsea Football Club jersey, moccasins, and, just for effect, two replica Seiko
watches – one on each wrist. Time obviously mattered to this guy, I mused. So,
why was he late?
The momentary shock of seeing Francis sapé wore off. Jules, Francis’s friend
and business partner, approached me. He laughed as he came off his bike in his
black three-piece suit and greeted us in the respectful Katangese manner of bring-
ing our heads to touch each other from side to side. I realized that their laughter
and smiles were a response to what they must have perceived to be my exaggerated
sense of surprise. I am sure they were wondering why it was so strange to me that
they were à la mode, akin to the male dancers of the Congolese pop-music sensa-
tion Werrason.2 Of course, they did not say that but they knew they had surprised
me, and, from their smiles, I gathered that this pleased them. With their arrival
Timothy Makori is a PhD candidate at the Department of Anthropology, University of Toronto.
Email: t.makori@mail.utoronto.ca
1La sape in Congolese French refers to an ostentatious display of clothing. When taken to the
extreme by sapeurs – those who sape – it refers to what Gondola (1999) has described as a ‘dream-
like hedonism’ expressed through particular forms of clothing that allow one to reconstruct both
time and space and in doing so recreate one’s identity.
2Werrason is a famous contemporary Congolese musician from Kwilu province. He is also
known to be one of the Congolese musicians most sympathetic to the plight of street children
in Congo.
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complete, Jules and Francis ferried Papa Kabongo and me to what they called a
‘quiet place’ where we could talk. Instinctively, I knew we were going to a bar and
the beers were on me.
***
This article is about young men like Francis and his friend Jules who work as creu-
seurs3 or craft diggers. To me, the play and display of these young men reveals a
few of the arresting paradoxes in the lives of creuseurs, such as the display of
plenty when otherwise lack is the norm, the disdain for formality unless it
meets practical ends, and the use of spectacle as a means of indicating and simul-
taneously masking social value (see Newell 2013). The delayed and unapologetic
entrance of Francis and Jules, their sapé display (when otherwise they were tanned
to their eyelashes in the reddish tinge of Katanga soil) along with the respectful
manner of greeting, indicative of how relative equals acknowledge each other,
were all attempts to disabuse me of what I thought I knew about creuseurs.
Francis and Jules, whom I repeatedly met in the mine of Kilobe4 in Haut-
Katanga province, wanted me to view them as coevals. They wanted me to recog-
nize them as being representative, and maybe even constitutive, of the here and
now as it is experienced and expressed in the Democratic Republic of Congo. It
is that emplacement, mutual recognition and historical experience I discuss in
this article.
To what do we owe the emergence of this social figure of the African miner in
the Copperbelt – a place once considered to be the bastion of modernity in Africa
(see Epstein 1967; 1981; Ferguson 1999; Gluckman 1960: 57; Powdermaker
1962)? Francis was just one of the approximately 50,000 to 250,000 young men
engaged in artisanal mining in Katanga province alone.5 Like his friend Jules,
Francis became a creuseur in the wake of the decline of industrial mining,
which took hold around 1990 when a collapse in global commodity prices
coupled with the gross mismanagement of the country led to dwindling revenues
from copper mining, resulting in the serious indebtedness of the state-run mining
company Gécamines.6 The remedy for the ailing Congolese economy came in
2002 when, with the insistence of the World Bank, the state liberalized the
mining sector and commenced a process of making redundant more than half
of the 24,000 workers of the company along with other public sector staff
(Rubbers 2010). The combined effects of the redundancy programme and the lib-
eralization of the mining sector basically mortgaged the futures of the dependants
3My research is based on ethnographic fieldwork undertaken in 2009, 2011 and 2013–14. Over
this period, I was in the field for a total of ten months, first for preliminary thesis fieldwork and
subsequently for extended fieldwork. I was mainly based in what is today Haut-Katanga province.
Given that my fieldwork occurred prior to the 2015 subdivision of provinces in DRCongo, the rest
of the article retains references to Katanga prior to subdivision.
4This is a pseudonym for the mine in southern Katanga where I conducted the majority of my
fieldwork.
5AWorld Bank study (2008: 56–7) estimates that 90 per cent of all mineral production in Congo
comes from artisanal miners, who are estimated to number between 500,000 and 2 million in the
country. See also Global Witness (2006).
6Gécamines is the Général de Carrières et des Mines. In colonial times, Gécamines was known
as the Union Minière du Haut Katanga (UMHK).
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of thousands of workers, compelling them to swap the classroom for the carrière
(artisanal mine). Somewhat predictably, liberalization also coincided with a rise in
global commodity prices that made the metal and mineral ores of the Copperbelt
an attractive investment in the global market (Trefon 2016: 119–46). The ensuing
rush for mining concessions in Katanga has pitted artisanal miners (creuseurs)
against the Congolese state and its partners: foreign mining companies.7
Beginning in 1995, conflicts between artisanal miners and large-scale mining
companies have been documented and linked to reforms in the mining laws and
regulations of at least thirty-six sub-Saharan African countries (Carstens and
Hilson 2009: 306). In a majority of cases,8 changes to the regulations governing
mining were taken with a view to increasing the participation of large-scale
mining companies and with little regard to the livelihood strategies of rural resi-
dents, small-scale farmers and other land-dwellers. The Congo Copperbelt is no
exception to the global trend of disregarding local livelihoods when enacting
policy reforms in the resource extraction sector. In fact, as I show below,
violent disregard for local societies is a recurring motif, particularly when one ana-
lyses the longue durée of resource extraction in Congo. That said, the presentist
focus of resource policy literature still offers useful insights that dispel automatic
links between the existence of natural resources and the incidences of violent
conflict (for a review, see Cuvelier et al. 2014) while at the same time advocating
for the recognition of artisanal mining in sub-Saharan Africa as a viable poverty
alleviation strategy (for a review, see Hilson and McQuilken 2014) and the inclu-
sion of women in mining (Bashwira et al. 2014; Werthmann 2009). However, this
literature often underplays the role and endurance of technologies of governance
and domination arising from the precolonial and colonial eras, particularly as
these continue to inform the organization of resource extraction and labour rela-
tionships in artisanal mining in sub-Saharan Africa. As the precolonial history of
mining in Africa shows, in many communities on the continent metallurgy was
about more than material needs because the significance of the process of extract-
ing and refining metals into valuable items influenced social relations in the sphere
of politics, gender and religion (Cline 1937; Diop 1988; Herbert 1984; 1993).
Therefore, an in-depth look at artisanal mining, which in Central Africawas a pre-
colonial practice, also requires a reflexive analysis that grapples with the recur-
sions and entanglements of the past as they manifest in and are informed by
the shifting demands of the present.
For artisanal miners in Katanga, the present is defined by the ominous threat of
dispossession. That which is sought by the state and private interests is the very
source of their livelihood and cultural identity: their ancestral lands. Thus,
resistance to dispossession attempts often takes violent and deadly forms. For
the state and foreign investors, mining land is a lucrative commodity that can
be prospected, traded or securitized in the present so as to generate future
7A similar trend has been noted in Eastern Congo with the arrival of large multinational cor-
porations such as Banro Corporation (Geenen and Hönke 2014).
8Cases of conflict between artisanal miners and mining corporations are also discussed in
Tanzania (Carstens and Hilson 2009), Ghana (Hilson and Yakovleva 2007) and Mozambique
(Dreschler 2001). Similar dynamics have also been noted in Papua New Guinea (Kirsch 1996;
2014).
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profits. To creuseurs, the hardening realities of the present reveal the future as con-
ceivable only in so far as it is connected to the moral matrices of the past that link
them as benefactors of the ancestors – the ‘true’ owners of the land. The conflict in
this context hinges almost entirely on the perceived attempt by capital to define the
future without any ‘space’ for the past: that is, without areas where local residents
can communally organize their labour as independent miners to exploit product-
ive resources. Therefore, I argue, creuseurs have come to understand attempts to
annex artisanal mines as corresponding to the evisceration of their pasts. In antici-
pation of the existential nature of this dispossession, I discuss how both the organ-
ization and the character of artisanal mining have been adapted by miners to
address the precarity they experience in the present. However, rather than trans-
forming social relations among miners, these adaptations to the threat of dispos-
session unintentionally reproduce the very structures of violence of the colonial
past they seek to overcome.
Below, I begin by first providing a brief historical backdrop to mining in Katanga
with the purpose of highlighting how artisanal mining re-emerges after industrial
decline. I then move on to provide an ethnographic analysis of creusage to show
how it is structured in ways that mirror and seemingly reproduce colonial relations
of violence. I close with a reflection of what the genealogy of artisanal mining
reveals about the emplacement of African mineworkers in the neoliberal present.
Copperbelt history and the emergence of the creuseur
To explain the ‘history of the present’ informing the emergence of the creuseur as a
social figure, it is necessary to situate the series of conjunctures that have shaped
and continue to shape mining in the longue durée of economic exchanges in
Central African history. This approach borrows from David Scott (1999: 15) the
view that ‘histories of the present ought to be attentive not only to the shifting con-
tours of the pasts they interrogate, but also to the shifting contours of the presents
they inhabit and from which they are being written’. It is also in response to an
emerging literature on Africa’s global labour history whose aim is to trace the his-
tories of neglected occupational groups (Barchiesi and Bellucci 2014; Bellucci and
Freund 2017; for the Congo, see Hendriks 2013). In my description of the prac-
tices, modalities and projects through which modernity inserted itself and
altered the lives of the Congolese, the event and structure of violence across gen-
erations emerge as a defining aspect of colonial experience in the Congo. For
Nancy Rose Hunt (2016), the insidious violence of the Belgian colonial era was
particular, for, as she argues, it sustained a generalized mood of ‘nervousness’
in the colonial state. As I suggest below, the postcolonial present is a problem
space still shaped by the history of colonial violence, and it is from that milieu
that the figure of the creuseur emerges.
Oral historians explain that, from 1600 to around 1800, the crowding of
strangers around centres of rare natural resources such as salt pans, copper
outcrops and iron deposits in the Congo Basin formed the early basis of political
centralization among the peoples of southern Congo (Vansina 1966). Increasing
exchange and control of these items for prestige purposes facilitated the rise
and spread of powerful centralized polities such as the Kongo, Kuba, Lunda
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and Luba kingdoms (Reefe 1981: 84; Vansina 1978;Macola 2002). In spite of their
systems of organization and political centralization, these kingdoms were ravaged
from the early 1700s to the mid-1800 by the transatlantic slave trade. JosephMiller
(1988: 153) suggests that the outcome of slavery in the Central African region was
that approximately 40 per cent of all slaves in the Americas came from West-
Central Africa (Lovejoy 1989: 388). Thus, it comes as no surprise that Jacques
Depelchin (2005) reminds us that the colonial encounter in the Congo Basin
begins not with the ‘scramble for Africa’, but with the Atlantic slave trade. The
combined effects of the collapse of the Kongo Kingdom, Portuguese slave raids
in the interior of West-Central Africa, the Imbagala attacks in South-Central
Africa and internecine group conflicts are responsible for dispatching 3.6
million central Africans into slavery between 1500 and 1800 (Lovejoy 2012: 73–4).
From around 1850 to 1890, the East African slave trade added to the waves of
human migration that had produced tremendous change in the demography, pol-
itical stability and economic production of the Congo Basin region.9 The assassin-
ation of the Sumba warlord Mushiri, who had established himself in the southern
region of the Lualaba using links to Zanzibari slavers, ultimately ushered in
Belgian rule in the Congo. Notwithstanding the resistance of Congolese commu-
nities to European rule, the annexation of Katanga and ultimately the Congo by
King Leopold II continued a process that had begun with the arrival of the first
Portuguese ships at the mouth of the Congo River. What differed between the
seventeenth-century mercantilist Portuguese and the late nineteenth-century
imperialist Belgians was not the ideology or even the methods of extraction, but
rather their scope: Leopold wanted and violently took the lives of the
Congolese and their natural resources – both of which he viewed as his personal
property. From 1885 to 1908, when the Congo Free State was abolished and the
colony transferred to the Belgian state, millions of Congolese lost their lives in
the ‘Red Rubber’ campaign orchestrated by private concession companies
(Hochschild 2005; Síocháin and O’Sullivan 2003).
In 1910, two years after the Belgian state took control of the Congo as a colony,
the railway from Southern Africa arrived in Elizabethville,10 facilitating the move-
ment of copper ore out of the Congo but also attracting more Europeans to work
for either the Union Minière du Haut Katanga (UMHK), Katanga railways, or
the Force Publique11 (Fetter 1976: 34). In order to obtain cheap labour,
Europeans imposed a head tax policy that was administered by local chiefs and
village headmen, resulting in a forceful push of Africans away from the country-
side and into urban centres. In fertile areas such as the northern Orientale prov-
ince, peasant farmers were compelled by the colonial state to grow cash crops
such as cotton at the expense of their food security (Likaka 1997). In the south,
9For the social cost of slavery in West-Central Africa, see Lovejoy (2012), MacGaffey (1977)
and Miller (1988). For a general overview of the effect of slavery on other African communities,
see Inikori and Engerman (1992), Miers and Klein (1999), Miers and Kopytoff (1977) and Willis
(1985).
10This was the colonial name of the city of Lubumbashi.
11The Force Publiquewas a paramilitary unit created by King Leopold II during the time of the
Congo Free State (1898–1910). It was responsible for enforcing Belgian colonial policy and it
played a significant part in meting out violence during the ‘Red Rubber’ campaigns in which mil-
lions of Congolese lost their lives (see Síocháin and O’Sullivan 2003).
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those forcefully conscripted to work in mines in Elizabethville lived in camps that
had, at best, ‘primitive’ conditions (Fetter 1976: 35).12 A similar dynamic of
urbanization across the border in Northern Rhodesia led anthropologists at the
Rhodes Livingstone Institute to focus on the ‘adaptation’ of Africans to life in
multi-ethnic mining towns (Epstein 1981; Mitchell 1957; 1961; Parpart 1983;
Powdermaker 1962; Wilson 1945).
At the peak of industrialization in the 1960s, mining companies were the dom-
inant social force in the African Copperbelt. In the city of Lubumbashi in the
Katanga province of Congo, residents lived according to the rhythm of the
state-run mining company, UMHK. It provided food, housing, medical care,
running water, and even paid the bridewealth for its workers, whom it considered
its ‘children’. The corporate welfare of the company was initially aimed at ‘stabil-
izing’ its workforce by enticing men to sign longer employment contracts (Dibwe
2001). By 1965, this programme was a success, and the average length of an
employee contract with the UMHK was nine years (Fabian 1973: 301). All the
children of mineworkers went to primary school; 30 per cent of the boys went
to professional school and the rest to the worksite.13 Homemaking schools pre-
pared wives and mothers for their new role as a ‘support system for salaried
male workers’ (Jewsiewicki 2010: 9; Hunt 1997). To historians, ‘stabilization’mis-
represented the fact that the management of the UMHKwas basically trying to
‘breed its own labor force’ (de Meulder 1996; Dibwe 2001; Fetter 1976: 466).
Evidence of the paternalism of the company in post-independence Congo was
reflected in the often-heard remarks that ‘Union Minière [kazi] njo baba, njo
mama’: that is, ‘Union Minière [salaried work] is father and mother’ (Dibwe
2004; Petit and Mutambwa 2005: 470).14 Through its system of ‘welfare capital-
ism’ in which work, leisure, lodging, healthcare, education, marriage, and even
spiritual life were controlled by the company and guaranteed on the basis of
employment, the company tried to create the male mineworker as domestic patri-
arch of a monogamous nuclear family. The fact that it offered bridewealth to new
recruits and restricted the movement and leisure of its workers led historians to
argue that the company was gradually trying to substitute itself for the clan and
extended family (Dibwe 2001: 55). Things took a turn for the worse in the
1980s as declining revenues from mining started to threaten the paternalist
image of the company, which by then had been renamed Gécamines. Cuts in
welfare took many of the residents of Katanga by surprise, for, unlike the rest
of the Congolese, revenues from mining had for decades offered relative stability
to the Katangese from much of the economic turmoil in post-independence
12Stories of Africans being eaten alive by batumbula, terrifying creatures that ate the flesh and
drank the blood of Africans in Katanga, circulated widely in Elizabethville and in Northern
Rhodesia during the early 1920s, and these speak of some of the violence of the colonial experi-
ence (see White 2000: 270).
13The ‘benevolence’ of the company nurtured a ‘myth of philanthropic paternalism’ (Higginson
1989: 185) based on the fact that, at independence in 1960, the UMHKwas directly responsible for
the destinies of 20,000 workers and total of 100,000 people (Jewsiewicki 2010: 9).
14The economic importance of the UMHK, not only to Katanga residents but also to the
Congolese postcolonial state, is made even more explicit if it is noted that, just prior to the collapse
of the company in 1990 with the closure of Kamoto mine, the UMHK contributed almost 40 per
cent of all foreign exchange revenue earned by the country (De Herdt 2002: 448). On the conse-
quences of UMHK paternalism, see Rubbers (2013).
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Congo. A sure sign of industrial decline came in the form of the closure of
Kamoto mine in 1990 (Rubbers 2009: 29). Despite the fact that the collapse of
mining was symptomatic of post-Cold War political realignments, wider state
failure, and the volatility of international markets, it was not experienced or
explained as such. Children apportioned blame to their fathers for taking all the
benefits of industrialism and leaving them with nothing. ‘Fathers’ became a
social group widely held responsible for mishandling independence and permit-
ting the ensuing corruption of President Mobutu15 and his elites (Jewsiewicki
2010: 10; see also Dibwe 2001). Decades of a colonially produced institutional
paternalism had eventually produced its own critique.
Dwindling American support for the kleptocratic regime of President Mobutu
set the stage for his violent removal from power in 1997, leading to a period of pro-
tracted violence in the country.16 This occurred at a time when the World Bank
and International Monetary Fund were implementing structural adjustment pro-
grammes (SAPs) across Africa. For the people of Katanga, structural adjustment
came in the form of the liberalization of the mining sector in 2002 and led to the
wholesale loss of tens of thousands of industrial jobs and the evaporation of many
of the welfare supports of the past (Rubbers 2010). It is in a post-industrial present
informed by generations of colonial violence and, more recently, the hardening
reality of economic liberalization that I analyse the figure of the creuseur in
Katanga.
Precarity and the colonizing structure
One of the aspects of the past made clear in the aforementioned history is that the
colonial encounter sought to utterly reorganize and destroy precolonial modes of
existence so as to define the form collective social life would henceforth take in
Congo. Fortunately, this process was not entirely successful. The memory and
practice of precolonial activities such as artisanal mining persisted at the turn
of the twentieth century despite colonial attempts to reorganize rural life
(Jewsiewicki 1983; Likaka 1997). Monseigneur de Hemptinne (1926), apostolic
vicar of the parish of Elizabethville (the present-day city of Lubumbashi),
describes how a Yeke ‘chief’ named N’kuba organized copper mining campaigns
after being trained and initiated into a guild of ‘copper eaters’. The campaign ran
in the dry season, around mid-May, after the harvest of sorghum, and it com-
menced with the ‘chief’ pronouncing ‘Tuye Tukadie Mukuba’, ‘Let us go eat
copper’ (de Hemptinne 1926: 381). On launching the mining campaign, the
‘chief’ summoned the ngang’a (ritual specialist) to invoke the assistance of the
Bakishi, or spirits of the ancestors. For four to five months, ‘Chief’ N’kuba
mined for copper ore, after which time smelting began. During the entire period
of ore extraction, N’kuba’s people relocated to the closest river or stream to the
15President Mobutu Sese Seko became the President of Congo in 1965 after the assassination of
the Prime Minister-elect Patrice Lumumba. He ruled Congo for thirty-two years.
16Laurent-Désiré Kabila deposed Mobutu from power in a coup that led to warfare all across
the country. This was followed by the second Congo war in the east from 1998 to 2003 (see
Reyntjens 2009).
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mine. After the extraction campaign, members of the village offered a portion of
their copper ore to the ‘chief’ in recognition of his role in ritually maintaining the
fertility of the land, but even after paying those dues, the men digging and women
cleaning the ore still obtained a substantial portion of the copper resource. It is esti-
mated that, from 1850 to 1910, the Basanga, who were famed as the ‘eaters of
copper’, produced approximately 700 tonnes of copper (de Hemptinne 1926: 402).
Many decades after the disappearance of the ‘eaters of copper’, artisanal
mining has returned to Congo. This return in the destructive wake of a declining
colonial industrialism reveals the uncanny nature of the past, for, while the prac-
tice largely retains its familiar precolonial form (consisting of the use of rudimen-
tary tools to dig for minerals in mines whose access is guaranteed communally), it
is nevertheless ‘strange’. Its strangeness is in large part a product of the timeliness
of its return to a present in which mining is singularly structured and based on the
imperatives of the global market rather than the stipulations of the precolonial
peasant economy. Thinking of artisanal mining today, one has to consider and
even juxtapose its doppelgänger: private concession mining. Both artisanal and
concession mining are enshrined in the revised Code Minier of 2002, and, given
the surge and declines of commodity prices over the past decade, these two
groups are often in competition for the same mining concessions. As I discuss,
the effect of this collision course between foreign investors and creuseurs routinely
results in the state-sanctioned privatization of artisanal mines.
While the seizure of artisanal mines by the state and private mining companies
may be akin to what David Harvey (2005) has called ‘accumulation by disposses-
sion’, it is by no means unique to the Congo. Such forms of seizure are a common
feature of contemporary imperialism, whose manifestation, particularly in the
West, is the physical, occupational and existential precarity of modern life
(Butler 2006; Standing 2011). To be precise, while in the West precarity
emerged at the turn of the twenty-first century and has come to refer to a politic-
ally induced condition that is the outcome of the systematic dismembering of
social and economic networks of support by the rapacious imperatives of neo-
liberal governance, in Africa this same pattern of social engineering by neoliberal
forces goes back to the mid-1980s. The idioms used to refer to precarity then (as
now) in Africa are ‘uncertainty’ (Callaghy and Ravenhill 1993; Cooper and
Pratten 2015; Smith 2015; Werbner 2002) and ‘crisis’ (Hoogvelt 1997; Mbembe
and Roitman 1995: 324; Petit and Mutambwa 2005). As attractive as it may be
to draw comparisons between precarity in the West and in Africa, such compar-
isons quickly run into problems when we move beyond the idiomatic expression
of ‘precarity’ and begin to tease out the historicity of such an experience.
Particularly in the resource economies of Central and Southern Africa, it is appo-
site to reflect on Frederick Cooper’s (2017: 148) claim that ‘if “precarity” has any
meaning it is as the reverse of “stabilization”’. This is because the social welfare
agenda of stabilization in the Copperbelt was not aimed at building a society
based on democratic values, equal opportunity and solidarity, as was the case in
twentieth-century Europe (and less so in the United States) (ibid.: 148).
‘Stabilization’ in Congo was a colonial project whose social welfare agenda was
aimed at increasing the survival rates of men living in mining camps so as to
‘breed aworkforce’ that would be solely reliant on waged labour for its social repro-
duction (deMeulder 1996; Dibwe 2001; Fetter 1976: 466). The fact that this process
was never fully successful is maybe the reason why the industrial decline was not
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completely disastrous for Copperbelt mineworkers (seeMususa 2010). This not only
highlights the resilience, thrift and resourcefulness of the Congolese in the face of
dramatic social change but also points to the structural violence inherent in ‘stabil-
ization’ as a colonial project. To say that the violence of stabilization did not
produce precarity in the lives of the Congolese would be disingenuous, and it there-
fore also ought to be expected that mine labour in the aftermath of colonial indus-
trialism would be as precarious – if not more so – as it was in the past. Considering
the specific trajectory of mine labour in Central African history from the peasant
past to ‘stabilization’ and the liberalized present, I am impelled to analyse the
‘precarity’ of creuseurs in the present not only as a politically induced condition
resulting from neoliberal forces but, more fundamentally, as a social condition
linked to the foundational and enduring violence of the ‘colonizing structure’.
As Valentin Mudimbe (1988: 15) reminds us, the structure of colonialism in
Africa entailed the domination of space, the reformation of the natives’ minds
and the restructuring of local economies. Nowhere was this more visible than in
the Copperbelt, where, as early as 1971, BernardMagubane17 argued that scholars
ought to view the modernization of the region as an acute pathology of colonial
experience. I want to suggest that Magubane’s (1971) admonition still rings true
in the context of post-industrial decline in Congo. For instance, if we consider
how rural life in colonial times was radically restructured to meet the demands
of industrialization in southern Katanga (Jewsiewicki 1983), then the corporate
social welfare regimes of Gécamines, which catered for a minority in urban
centres, start to appear more an exception than the norm. Similarly, the disposses-
sion, impoverishment, generational disenfranchisement and inability to connect
means and ends experienced by creuseurs when viewed from a longue durée per-
spective suggest that precarity has quite likely been the norm for a majority in
rural and urban Congo for decades. Furthermore, the fact that many young
men working as creuseurs were the descendants of mineworkers who were once
conscripted and then later seduced by employment-linked guarantees of industrial
welfare, only to be discarded and rendered abject by the whims of global finance,
speaks to the exceptionalism of the industrial moment as much as to the tenacity
of colonially induced inequality. The recursive and insidious nature of gener-
ational inequality emanating from a colonial ordering of social experience in
the Congo is what concerns me in this article. As Anibal Quijano (2000)
reminds us, the structures of power produced by colonialism and persisting in
its wake to codify and hierarchically order global and domestic social relations
are an index of the coloniality of experience. It is these same structures that I
have in mind when I explore below the extent to which the precarity experienced
by creuseurs in the present is informed by the colonial encounter.
The creuseurs of south Katanga
Liberalization of the Congolese mining industry in 2002 produced a mixed bag of
results. While on the one hand it coincided with a rise in world metal prices – at a
17See the critique of the indices used by Rhodes Livingstone Institute scholars to study social
change in Magubane (1971: 431).
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time when the economic opportunities for many families in Katanga were in steep
decline – it offered employment to only a small fraction of the more than 10,000
redundant workers of Gécamines. Furthermore, although changes in the mining
code attracted foreign investment, hardly any of the benefits of such investments
landed in the hands of the vast number of children whose parents were made
redundant by Gécamines. Life for these young men and women was collectively
far worse than anything their parents had ever experienced. Unable to continue
with school and with no means of support, these children and youth descended
– in the thousands – to the copper, gold and cobalt mines of Katanga to earn a
living. A flourishing artisanal mining industry also attracted young people from
the western provinces of Kasai, hundreds of kilometres away. Those from Kasai
had grown up in the shadow of a different state-run company, MIBA, or
Sociéte Minière de Bakwanga, but, from the early 1980s, they too experienced an
industrial decline that could match, if not rival, that of Gécamines. Upon their
arrival in Katanga, a considerable number of these new migrants went to work in
artisanal mines as creuseurs, mineral ore cleaners, transport providers, petty
traders and mineral traders, or négociants. The result of the migration of people
from different parts of Congo such as Kasai andKivu provinces has been the sprout-
ing of artisanal mines and mine villages in different parts of southern Katanga.
Typically, creuseurs are almost exclusively young men between the ages of
fifteen and forty. They earn a living by digging for copper, cobalt and gold and
work independently or in small groups of around four or five individuals in
what are often remote locations that the Congolese state has demarcated for
small-scale artisanal mining. The majority of creuseurs are not contractually
bound to person or place and tend to work when and more or less how they
wish. In theory, a young man going into the artisanal mine needs a permit from
one of the two unions involved in artisanal mining in Katanga: EMAK,18 the
Association for Artisanal Miners of Katanga, or CMKK, Cooperative Madini
kwa Kilimo. In practice, very few get one.19 Young men insert themselves as
their circumstances demand. For usufruct rights, they are charged a tax by local
authorities, which is often 10 per cent of the ore they produce from deep-shaft
copper, gold or cobalt mines. Mining is carried out only by men, a fact that can
be traced back to the colonial division of labour in the early industrial era,
when, generally, urban life forced men to serve as wage labourers (miners) and
women as reproductive subjects (mothers). Over the years, this gendered division
of labour has come to attain various cultural justifications among artisanal miners.
One view I often heardwas that the presence of women in a mine angers the spirits
of the mine and makes the ore disappear. These spirits are most often female in
gender and miners say that they harbour jealousy towards local women,
thereby justifying the taboo against them in the mine (see also Cuvelier 2011b).
Enforcement of this taboo has turned artisanal mines into hyper-masculine
spaces with anywhere from 200 to more than 10,000 people. To obtain a sense
of how an individual ends up as a miner, let me return to Francis, one of my
18EMAK is the Exploitants Miniers Artisanaux du Katanga.
19A study by Pact (2010) noted that, of 267 interviewed miners, only 16 per cent identified them-
selves as being members of either one of the two unions of artisanal miners (see Tsurukawa et al.
2011: 30).
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key informants in the mine of Kilobe where I carried out most of my fieldwork.
When I first met him in 2011, he detailed the circumstances leading to his life
in the mine as follows:
I was born in Likasi in August of 1986. My father worked for an industrial metal
company called SOCRAL here in Likasi until he got sick in 1997. As the first born in
my family I dropped out of school and started to hustle. Four years later, I ended up
in the mines. I started off as a salizer,20 then I began carrying the ore from the mine to
the river for cleaning. Afterwards I joined the ‘chain’21 and I was getting paid for remov-
ing the ore from the mining shaft. At last, they allowed me to start working on the
‘tableau’.22 I became a creuseur.
The narrative pattern that Francis outlines above of his father’s illness and, quite
possibly, subsequent loss of employment, leading to the discontinuation of his
studies, was a recurring theme in the interviews and focus group discussions I con-
ducted with creuseurs. If there was sickness involved then the explanation often
given to me of how they ended up in the mines was reduced to one word:
‘crise’. The ‘crise’ was an implicit reference to the relationship between the
macro-structural trajectory of industrial decline and its attendant effects in
the domestic life of individuals. It was the impetus behind ‘debrouillardise’ or
the ‘fend-for-yourself’ culture that scholars have identified as being a pervasive
feature of contemporary Congolese social life (Petit and Mutambwa 2005;
Trefon 2004). The particular manifestation of the need for improvisation in
order to survive led Francis and others to the mines due, in large part, to a lack
of means and a recent ‘renaissance’ in mining in Katanga (Trefon 2016: 119–
46). Most of the mines upon which young men descended in the early 2000s
were ancient artisanal mines that had been taken over by the UMHK and later
abandoned by the company as industrialism collapsed in the 1990s. These
mines were often in peri-urban and rural areas, off the beaten track and far
from urban centres. Venturing into what are often remote and abandoned mines
to dig out minerals is more than a part-time vocation; it has become a career
for individuals such as Francis. As he explains, perpetual movement defines the
improvisation in his life.
I’ve worked all over. I started in Shinko23 in 2001 mining cobalt. Then I went to Milele,
Miringi, Kabunji, Kilobe, Mbola, Kansunga, Luisha, Kolwezi and now I am back at
Kilobe. I have been a creuseur for more than ten years and it is only this that I have done.
20Salir in French is ‘to make dirty’. The usage here is slang and refers to the teenage boys who
get dirty by sifting out the soil from the malachite in water so as to obtain a cleaner product.
21The ‘chain’ is literally a chain of individuals who are situated on the walls of the mining shaft
and work to haul out both the ore and the removed soil as it is made available from deep in the
mineshaft.
22Tableau in French, as it is used here, refers to the subterranean surface from which ores are
extracted.
23Shinkolobwe mine. This is one of the oldest Gécamines mines and is infamous for being the
site from which uranium was sourced for the Hiroshima and Nagasaki atomic bombs. The
company abandoned it in the early 1990s but it was very poorly fenced off. By 2001 it had
become a hive of activity for creuseurs and it was shut down, but reports of artisanal mining in
the area still persist (Marnham 2013).
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Although Francis does not mention it, the movement of creuseurs in the Congo
Copperbelt was an involuntary outcome of a complex array of forces. Artisanal
miners often left designated mines in which they worked purely based on
rumours about booming mines elsewhere. Sometimes such rumours were true;
most of the time they were not. If a miner fell for such a rumour and arrived at
a site only to find out that a particular vein of minerals was exhausted or the
mine was facing closure because it had been annexed by the state, he would end
up moving to a neighbouring mine or would most likely remain stranded at
that remote location. Unable to pay his way back home, the only option for a
stranded miner was to lease his services as a hired hand or mercenaire for a
daily wage. This sort of arrangement plunged many into a cycle of poverty
whereby they were forced to live on a very meagre wage of around US$3 to
US$5 per day until and unless they obtained enough to leave the mines. It is
not impossible to survive on such a wage in a city such as Likasi, and many do
get by. However, given this amount in a remote mine where a person’s social net-
works are limited (if any) and, more importantly, basic social services are lacking
and the provision of them is the source of steep profiteering, those working as
hired hands find themselves in extremely precarious positions. Almost all the
money such a miner will earn in a day will be spent on paying for lodging and
food, making an individual extremely beholden to the whims of others or unend-
ing indebtedness. Francis’s movement in the various artisanal mines can be under-
stood, on the one hand, as indexing the momentary notoriety of particular mining
sites (some of which are currently shut down by the state), and, on the other hand,
as reflecting his spatial history of indebtedness. Consider how he explains this in a
conversation we had in 2011:
I marriedwhen I was seventeen andwe had four children in the carrières but we separated
with my first wife. Her behaviours were hard [to stomach]. She stole from me and was ill
mannered so I left her in 2009. I opened a mine in Kilobe and my luck changed. A few
days after we started working we found the ‘mother vein’.24 I made over US$2,000 in one
day. I was lucky. I made wonderful sums of money.
[I] am lucky because I respect my parents and I care for them. When I have money I give
them some, you see. Timoté, [I] am a businessman. I have bought three [small] houses and
six motorbikes from this work and whenever I have money I use some of it to buy mer-
chandise. My current wife is a négociant.
In this line of work, courage comes from your decisions and money is what motivates me.
We suffer to find the ore. Once, my entire équipe ran way. They saw danger in the mine-
shaft but I fixed it and it became operational. I have seen mining holes collapse many
times. I have seen people die but I have never stopped creusage.
By 2011, Francis had worked in more than half of the artisanal mines in Katanga,
moving as new mines opened up and also as the various mining operations he was
working in as a hired hand ran out of money. When he eventually landed in Kilobe
in 2010, his luck changed and it is there that I first met him. At twenty-six years
24Deposits of copper are often found in veins within particular sections of the earth strata. The
linearity of copper columns accounts for why the area in Central Africa where copper is found is
named the Copperbelt.
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old, he was remarried, the father of five, a creuseur turned successful businessman.
My early conversations with Francis included numerous remarks in which he
exuded a deep desire to fashion his life and the choices informing it as a success
story. Take, for instance, the manner in which he glosses over abandoning his
ex-wife and their four children as if it were simply her fault: ‘she stole and was
ill mannered’. He also frames his decision to rid himself of her as being the
main strategy that changed his ‘luck’. To be sure, he says, he was vindicated
when ‘a few days later’ he struck it big. Purporting that his ex-wife was the
cause of the blockages he had been experiencing until then was possibly
another way of implying that she may have been a witch. Claims such as these
were rife in the mines, in no small part because they helped people make sense
of the misfortune they experienced as marginalized individuals in a world in
which their social position denied them alternative perspectives on the complex-
ities they faced. To counter such positioning, someone such as Francis crafted a
persona that reinforced his exceptionality, an image also in keeping with his
social status as the elected ‘president’ of the creuseurs of Kilobe. Of course, the
fact that he had had a windfall contributed significantly to his election as leader
of a large group of young men with practically identical aspirations: to get rich
quick. However, unlike many of his friends and peers, such as Jules, who
aspired to own a truck and start a large-scale transport business, Francis was sin-
gularly focused in furthering his career in and through artisanal mining, for this
was what he knew how to do best.
Sure enough, three years later I met him in the city of Likasi on my last research
visit. He was still working as a creuseur but I could see that his enthusiasm was
waning. The ‘renaissance’ of industrial mining that had begun in 2003 and sur-
vived the 2008 financial crisis was finally tapering off in early 2014, along with
China’s booming industrial growth. Francis viewed the local slump as temporary
but its impacts signalled quite the opposite. In the three years since I had last seen
him, Francis had sold all his motorcycles and two of his houses, and was now very
dependent on the income of his wife to launch any new artisanal mining explora-
tions. In addition, his équipe had once again deserted him, but he was still plan-
ning to go to work in the next hotspot: the mine of Lupoto. To make some
money to finance a mineshaft in Lupoto, Francis had come up with a plan of
selling DVDs to the owners of television theatre halls in Kilobe. The plan was
obviously one among many and it became clear to me that it was not working
when, a week later, I met him in Kilobe wearing the same clothes I had last
seen him in. Suspecting that he was not going home to his wife, I asked his
friends and I was informed that he was having problems with his wife and had
been spending the night in the Kilobe mine. Francis the braggart was slowly
giving way to Francis the choquer, a hustler keen to make a hit (un choc). All
the signs were pointing to the end of the days of plenty, and, although this reversal
of fortune was stark, it was also predictable because it coincided with the global
decline of copper prices from 2013 onwards.25 Francis’s fortunes, like those of
many other creuseurs, were totally in sync with global commodity markets.
25See Nasdaq’s ‘Copper: latest price and chart for high grade copper’ <http://www.nasdaq.com/
markets/copper.aspx?timeframe=6y>, accessed 1 June 2017.
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Practically all of the young men who rush to the mines come from families with
limited means to begin with, and, of those in this group, a considerable number
began mining at a young age, meaning that they had quite limited education.
Those individuals who were forced to become creuseurs but have managed to
move out of the job to become motorcycle chauffeurs or négociants are often
young men with a relatively advanced educational background – a number may
have even started or completed university but found few opportunities to
provide for their families. Young men such as Francis who persist with creusage
despite their experiences and best intentions do so because many of the income-
generating projects they initiated fail. These failures are not only the result of
their actions but also the outcome of an inability to sufficiently insulate their
nascent businesses from the risks they face on a daily basis. An accident or the
illness of a friend or family member is enough to bankrupt a creuseur turned
motorcycle chauffeur or leave them heavily indebted. For someone such as
Francis, whose daily life was a series of risks and gambles that intermittently
paid off, the loss of his motorcycles and houses over a period of three years was
as much a reflection of the vicissitudes of the mining economy in Katanga as
they were an effect of precariousness. For creuseurs who have little formal educa-
tion and are thus forced to spend more than a decade in rural and peri-urban arti-
sanal mines despite their best intentions, self-employment is viewed as the only
antidote to being unemployed and unemployable. Few, if any, of these young
men can access the limited employment opportunities offered by the many multi-
national mining companies in the Congo Copperbelt. In my view, creuseurs are
not entirely a ‘reserve army of labour’, as Marx (1992 [1887]) would have it,
since many lack the formal competencies for highly mechanized industrial
work, but nor are they a ‘lumpen’ group, for individually and collectively they
make a significant contribution to resource production and the local economies
of mining areas. Simply thinking of creuseurs as ‘informal workers’ similarly mis-
construes the legal standing and regulated nature of artisanal mining in Congo.
Small-scale artisanal mines in Katanga not only attract creuseurs but also a
wide range of other types of labourers. Artisanal mining has spawned a whole
cottage industry of services in remote areas because productive mines are often
awash with real (and speculative) money. The vibrancy of such spaces is
reflected by the multitude of ‘informal’ workers, ranging from money transfer
agents to sex workers, restauranteurs and ‘hoteliers’ to ‘doctors’, turning placid
rural areas into bustling centres of commerce with tens of thousands of
people.26 In these bush enclaves, housing, public amenities, businesses and state
‘offices’ are made of sticks and sackcloth, materials that are cheap, portable
and recyclable. Small fuel generators power fridges and televisions, and practically
all transport is by motorcycle. Young men on Bajaj motorcycles, or moto, trans-
port everything from mattresses to crates of beer. Creuseurs will tell you that, if
something cannot be carried by moto, then it is probably not needed. Jules
would often remind me that ‘Bintu apa il faut kuwa portable’, ‘Everything here
must be portable’.
26Examples of such areas are Kimanyuki, Miringi, Luisha, Mbola, Kamatanda and Kansunga
in Katanga.
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Part of the logic of portability and transience reflected in the architecture of
mine villages is a consequence of the imperatives of mine work. As I came to
learn, the restlessness of creuseurs is informed by an awareness of fluctuating
mineral prices for the three main ores mined by artisanal miners in south
Katanga: gold, copper and cobalt. If gold prices are up, one shifts from mining
copper or cobalt and goes to the gold mines; the process is reversed when gold
prices fall relative to other minerals. Generally, the trend in the mines is that
the traffic of people varies in relation to mineral prices. Buyers of minerals,
négociants, sponsor creuseurs to open mining shafts, thereby attracting an increas-
ing number of youth and petty traders to the mines. The downside to a boom in
mineral prices is that it also attracts the attention of investors or private specula-
tors who have more money and the necessary political influence to lease the very
concessions in which the creuseurs work. Visibility invites the threat of expropri-
ation of mining sites and local livelihoods – a threat that some creuseurs
counter by admitting that they are ‘ready to die’ in defence of their mines.
Militarism and seizure in the mines
Talkof ‘dying for the mine’ initially struck me as hyperbole, a locally acceptedway
of distinguishing a persona through exaggerated praise. In Kingwana, a Katanga
dialect of Swahili, they called it kutapa, and creuseurs are masters of exaggeration.
I did not think much of the claim that young men would sacrifice their lives until I
started to unpack the organizational structure of relationships within an artisanal
mine. The more I observed, the more they seemed to mimic those of formal
militaries. Occupational names of certain key jobs in the mine, such asmercenaires
(hired hands/mercenaries), négociants (price brokers/peacemakers) and dirigeants
(managers/commanders), speak of a division of labour that seeks to mirror
military battalions. A subset of creuseurs in Kilobe mine were adherents of
Rastafarianism and they imposed strict discipline among their members partly
because they had to contend with local suspicions that they were societal rebels
and drug addicts. Discipline among Rasta creuseurs was enforced through an
organizational hierarchy that included generals, brigadiers, colonels and officers
(see also Cuvelier 2011b). The hyper-masculine character of the carrière, its
remoteness, the demand for portability, productivity and hard labour in remote
environments inspire some creuseurs to imagine themselves as soldiers.27
Donatien, a long-time miner in Kilobe, explained to me:
A creuseur is like a soldier. He gets his ‘gun’, his metallic mining bar, hammer and shovel
and he gets to work. He can get people to help and they will not care if he is from
Kisangani or wherever. They will all just get to work.28
27In 2011, I conducted a focus group discussion in the office of EMAKwith a group of over
forty creuseurs just prior to their ‘deployment’ to a private mine in Kifumpa in south-western
Katanga. I was invited to talk to them as they awaited instructions, counselling and money
before departing to the carrière.
28Translated by the author.
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The sense that working in the mines is like soldiering for a cause is reinforced by
the fact that miners have to work in équipes, or teams of four or five people. Miners
often live with their teams in small shacks around the mineshaft itself or in a mine
village nearby. Every day, as one descends down the mining shafts to work, one
does so as a member of a unit. Given the perilous nature of artisanal mining, it
would not be a stretch of the imagination to compare the camaraderie and
support among members of équipes of creuseurs to the esprit de corps in organized
state militaries. I want to suggest that the modelling of life in artisanal mines along
militaristic lines is not a haphazard transplantation of war fantasies from else-
where; in fact, it is a manifestation of what Frantz Fanon (1963: 30–2) called
the atmosphere of violence: that is, a general state of anxiety, nervousness and inse-
curity that defines a colonial environment. Part of the unconscious logic underpin-
ning the creuseurs’ militaristic organization of work is the need to resist a state
whose approach to resource extraction, from its very inception, has been
extremely violent and currently remains so. By and large, this rapacious mode
of resource extraction has remained unchanged from the colonial era – even
today, its imperatives are driven by foreign interests who profit at the expense of
the Congolese. Thus, I read the turn to militarism by creuseurs as a didactic
response to an autocratic, masculine, hierarchical and often arbitrary postcolonial
state whose modality of power does not necessarily appeal to reason in public life
but to the whims, drives, sensations, pleasures and pains of its elites, who are its
main beneficiaries (Mbembe 2001: 102–33).29 One may even go as far as to say
that it is a contemporary manifestation of the internalization of the violent histor-
ies that created the Congolese state and continue to perpetuate its existence.
If the structure of the collective organization of creusage hints at an attempt to
discipline and organize young men, then that same desire is also reflected in how
mining space is regulated. The entire artisanal mine is a tightly controlled space
littered with state agents from military intelligence, the mining police, the provin-
cial administration and EMAK. The overriding claim by these state actors in arti-
sanal mines is that their presence ensures order and security in mining operations.
This claim is rendered specious at best because, as mentioned earlier, there is avery
clear division of labour in an artisanal mine, from the extraction of the ores to
their purchase. State agents do not make work in the mine more orderly; rather,
they add to the atmosphere of violence in a mine. Mining police and intelligence
agents are armed with rifles and pistols, and, like other state officials, they pay for
their presence in the mine by extorting creuseurs and mineral buyers, négociants,
based on the volume of extracted ore. Like other artisanal mines in Eastern
Congo (Geenen and Classens 2013; Smith 2015), Kilobe is highly securitized:
mining police control entry and exit points to the mine; the customary ‘chief’
organizes and regulates the partition and use of land for mining, commercial
and residential purposes; and various other officials tax miners and mineral
traders. Local villagers, along with the wives and girlfriends of creuseurs and
négociants, run the majority of businesses in the villages surrounding the mine,
29In July 2017, the Congo Research Network revealed that President Joseph Kabila and his
family had amassed tremendous wealth through a vast business network created during his
fifteen-year tenure as leader (see Maclean 2017).
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providing food, lodging and various other services. For as long as there is money
to be made, the state remains ever present and commands a fee through its officials
or indirectly through customary authorities. To many in the mine, this confirms
the view that the existence of these authorities in the mines is focused on using
seizure to satisfy material needs.
The onerous presence of the state is as much a source of anger as it is of satire.
During my fieldwork it was a running joke when someone asked you the following:
Question: Unayua maana ya l’état? [Do you know the meaning of the state?]
Response: [After a guess] Apana. [No.]
Punchline: [Snatching whatever the other person holds in his hands] Leta! [Bring it!]
‘To bring’ in Swahili literally translates as ‘kuleta’. However, when used in its
command form, the prefix ku- is dropped, leaving leta, which is pronounced
‘leh-tah’ and is phonetically similar to l’État (the state) in French.
The presence of state functionaries does not provide security or support to
people in the mines in any meaningful way; in fact, many a time it offered the
opposite. It took only a moment’s notice to bring the forces of the state bearing
down on an area, seizing it and expelling all within it. For creuseurs, the army
and the police in Katanga exist especially for this purpose, since they are regularly
co-opted by private interests or bazungu (foreigners), as they say, making them the
face of the violence of privatization to creuseurs. As a consequence, the sight of a
muzungu in the mine was explained to me as the death of the mine, for it is per-
ceived that this racial ‘Other’ has dominating intentions. A muzungu is enough
to get everyone to stop working in preparation for a fight. The disruptive nature
of the encounters with muzungu carries echoes of other violent encounters
between Africans and Europeans in the region. One of the most deadly of these
was that between Émile Storms of the International African Association of the
Belgian King, Leopold II, and Lusinga lwa Ng’ombe, a Tabwa chief who was
beheaded for resisting colonial rule (Roberts 2012). Similarly, Kienda Biela was
skinned alive in Elizabethville by the Belgians for opposing the construction of
the railway through his village (Fabian 1990: 79–81). Recalling the harrowing vio-
lence of colonial encounters in Katanga’s past, one may begin to appreciate the
anxiety of creuseurs when they encounter foreigners in communal artisanal
mining lands.
Possessing pasts and dispossessing presents
Fears that the mine could be shut down or expropriated loom large over creuseurs
and others whose livelihoods are shaped and supported by artisanal mining. This
fear is born out of experiences of lost livelihoods and deaths that have occurred in
places such as Mbola, a mine village about 50 kilometres from the city of Likasi.
In 2006, Mbola was a booming cobalt-mining site for tens of thousands of creu-
seurs when state authorities decided to lease out the mining concession to a
private investor at very short notice (Cuvelier 2011a). Demonstrations and pro-
tests against the actions of the state lasted weeks, and not even the brutality of
the army could convince creuseurs to abandon what they claimedwas ‘their moun-
tain’. Chants of ‘Bulongo ni wa bankambo’, ‘The earth is our ancestors’, rallied all
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those disenfranchised by the privatization of the mine into a frenzy of violence. In
Likasi, one informant mentioned that creuseurs fromMbola went on the rampage
after the army arrived, and, upon reaching Likasi, raided the office of the mayor,
destroying everything. They tried to capture the mayor of Likasi in order to strip
him naked and shame him for colluding to expropriate ‘their ancestors’ land’.30
In a focus group discussion I conducted in 2011 with a group of around thirty
creuseurs who eventually had to leave Mbola, the predicament of miners was
described as follows:
The creuseur discovers ore in the mountain; it is we who discover the ore. By this I mean
we are like geologists, we expend a lot [of money, energy, time, knowledge] on the moun-
tain. We pay for ritual ceremonies; we expend money every day on developing the hole
but the whites come and buy the mountain at the price they like. The ‘white man’ and
the government don’t see the expenditure [we have incurred]. The situation is something
like this: you have just married your wife and then, sometime later, you come to discover
that your wife was already married to another man. How would you explain that?
Land is viewed by creuseurs as an inalienable resource since it is tied to local histories
and thus demands unique skills to make it productive. All of this local knowledge is
rendered obsolete and unwanted in the future-oriented optics of the state and
private investors. As the young man explained, ‘the white man and the state’ do
not see their expenditure. This blindness, according to them, is a negation of
history, labour and collective identity, which implies that creuseurs are out of step
with the contemporary neoliberal order. The affective dimensions of this spatial dis-
placement led creuseurs to compare the relationship between them and the moun-
tain as being analogous to a marriage between a man and his wife. Relationships
between creuseurs and the ancestral spirits residing in mountains undergo perpetual
shifts, but because of the risky nature of underground mining, many recognize that
these relations are deeply personalized. In all the artisanal mines I visited, it was
rumoured that there were individuals who used charms of sorcery, lawa, to obtain
the minerals, but often these were unproven claims. However, at the collective
level of the mine, miners knew that there was a constant need to appease the
spirits ‘mizimu’ of the mountain, either through rituals or offerings given to the cus-
tomary chief. In mines such as Kilobe, placating the spirits is thought to help
prevent the absence of mineral ore and instances of injury or death due to collapsing
mining shafts. Annexing the land by fiat is thus not only violent but is also viewed as
an existential attack aimed at dispossessing miners of their links to the material
resources that animate their spiritual connection to the land.
For many creuseurs, discovering the ore is an act of benevolence by spirits. This
relationship to the land mirrors that of their forefathers, les mangeurs de cuivre,
who viewed mining as an animated process of ‘eating copper’ that was offered
to them by their ancestors. Consequently, seizure of the mountain of Mbola by
a muzungu – a foreigner – was not only perceived as an affront to miners’
30In a discussion about Mbola with a négociant, Mr Kasongo, he mentioned to me that he lost
his son in the violence of Mbola in 2006. Subsequent to that, his wife left him and told him to stop
working in the mines. He blamed his woes on foreigners, bazungu, who come to Congo to ‘buy the
country’, leaving the locals with nothing. He was furious when it came to issues regarding bazungu
involvement in artisanal mining.
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livelihoods but also to their sense of self-worth31 and collective identity as the des-
cendants of ‘living ancestors’. In rhetorically asking me ‘How do you explain
that?’, the group of creuseurs were appealing to me – as a man – not for a
reason but for an action. To them it was inexplicable why someone would seize
the mine, with complete disregard for those for whom it was a source of livelihood.
What one had to do was fight. The tendency to force and violence as a tactic of
resistance against foreign capital among creuseurs has led polite society in
Katanga to label creusage as a job for hooligans, thereby depoliticizing it and min-
imizing its socio-historical complexity. Certainly, the work of creuseurs is a source
of anxiety not only for the parents of miners but even for the traders who work
with them on a daily basis. Take, for instance, an individual like Papa Felicien,
a father of four who had grown up working in the diamond-mining industry of
Kasai province. He had gone to university, studied theology and become a
pastor, only for his church to collapse, forcing him, thirty years later, to reluctantly
return to the mines as a négociant, or mineral trader. He bought copper ore from
creuseurs and sold it to Chinese and Lebanese mineral buyers. For Papa Felicien,
creusage was ‘un jeu de fous’, ‘a game for the mad’:
Creusage has no benefits. It sends people to enter into witchcraft and witchcraft kills. If
you send a child to work as a creuseur, you are killing them. All creuseur activity is bad, it
makes a child uncivil; dull of the mind. It’s a crazy game. It is death. Among these chil-
dren, there are licensed university graduates; what is it they lack?…When we grew up life
was good, but our children are growing up like vagabonds.
The parental fear of moral corruption in the mine is very real, as Papa Felicien
observes, and so too is colonial nostalgia, especially as a ‘structure of feeling’
among an older generation of Congolese citizens (Makori 2013). But both of these
concerns have far less weight than the imperatives of making a daily wage. If we
recall that many creuseurs are the ‘children’ of former industrial workers, then we
must also acknowledge that creusage as a social practice is a contemporary sign of
compounded generational disenfranchisement in the neoliberal present. Although
creuseurs engage with the market in meaningful ways as petty traders, consumers,
tax-paying citizens, parents, husbands and working youth, polite society in Katanga
still views themas ‘bad, crazy, uncivil, and dull-minded’.While these views reflect gen-
erational anxieties over the trajectories of youth, they also unfortunately play into the
interests of global capital, for they support the misguided view that creusage is a dis-
pensable practice in the inevitable march of capitalism in Congo. The more than
200,000 artisanal miners in Katanga alone suggest that this is far from true.
Conclusions
Aversion to risk, whether physical or material, is not a feature that marks life as a
creuseur. Being a creuseur in Katanga means living constantly on the edge: at risk
31For a lengthier discussion on the masculinity of Katanga miners, see Cuvelier (2011b). For an
analysis of the association between diamond mining and hunting among the Aluund, see De
Boeck (1998).
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of dying, being completely disfigured by the collapsing earth, being financially
ruined by the market, or having your mine abruptly expropriated by private inter-
ests. Although the dangers of life in the mines are known, people – both young and
old – keep returning to the mines in spite of their better judgement and planning.
Precarity is a constant feature of social life in contemporary Congo, and neither
education nor social status sufficiently insulate people from it. This marks a differ-
ence with industrial life in Katanga, a life enjoyed by a minority and predicated on
‘stability’ and a salaried sedentary social order based on welfare guarantees. The
collapse of this industrial model of welfare capitalism produced a distrust of
employment and salaried life, just as it engendered desperation and a ‘fend-for-
yourself’ attitude on an unprecedented scale, especially among young men in
Katanga. Youth working as creuseurs live in the present and for themselves;
they are keen to ‘take the waiting out of the wanting’ (Comaroff and Comaroff
2006: 267–80). Their claims to subsist off the land are couched in a language of
inalienable rights: ‘the earth is our ancestors’, ‘bulongo ni ya bankambo’. This
mobilization of the past is a strategic response to the dispossession faced in the
present and it dislocates the market-driven future horizon of capital authored by
the state and foreign investors by laying claim to an anterior ‘sovereign’ – the
ancestors – whose existence predates colonialism. While the response to the
threat of dispossession draws on the precolonial era to secure a future for creuseurs,
both the structure and character of the labour of creuseurs are defined by technolo-
gies of domination whose ambit is grounded in the violence of the colonial encoun-
ter. Herein lies the uncanny of the creuseur: a contemporary but tragic figure of the
African miner whose formation and claim to the land draw social force from the
moral matrices of the precolonial era yet whose organizational structure is
informed by the same relations of hierarchy and domination he seeks to overcome.
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Abstract
The Copperbelt of Congo was once the bastion of industrial development and no
individual embodied its modernity as fully as the salaried industrial miner. Today,
with the near collapse of the state-run mining company, Gécamines, and the lib-
eralization of the mining industry starting in 2002, the majority of miners are no
longer trained and salaried industrial workers but rather children and youth eking
out a precarious living as artisanal miners or creuseurs. In Congo, artisanal mining
is paradoxical, for, although it indexes a future of unskilled, untrained, flexible
work in rural and peri-urban enclaves, its organization of labour and rudimentary
techniques of copper extraction allude to and borrow from the colonial and pre-
colonial past. Creuseurs mobilize the past as a strategic response to the threat of
dispossession of ‘their’ land by the state and foreign investors, and they do so by
laying claim to an anterior ‘sovereign’ – the ancestors – whose existence predates
colonialism. This paradoxical emplacement of artisanal mining, its entanglement
in time, invites interrogation of some of the ways in which scholars have under-
stood precarity not only as a politically induced condition resulting from neo-
liberalism but also as an outcome of the enduring nature of the colonizing
structure in Africa.
Résumé
La Copperbelt du Congo fut autrefois le bastion du développement industriel et
nul n’incarnait autant sa modernité que le mineur industriel salarié.
Aujourd’hui, avec le quasi-effondrement de la société minière d’État Gécamines
et la libéralisation de l’industrie minière entamée en 2002, la majorité des
mineurs ne sont plus des travailleurs industriels formés et salariés, mais des
enfants et des jeunes gagnant tout juste de quoi vivre en travaillant comme creu-
seurs. Au Congo, l’exploitation minière artisanale est paradoxale en ce qu’elle
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augure un futur de travail sans qualification, sans formation et flexible dans des
enclaves rurales et périurbaines, tandis que l’organisation du travail et les techni-
ques rudimentaires d’extraction du cuivre évoquent et empruntent au passé colo-
nial et précolonial. Les creuseursmobilisent le passé comme réponse stratégique à
la menace de dépossession de « leur » terres par l’État et les investisseurs étrangers,
et ils le font en revendiquant un « souverain » antérieur (les ancêtres) dont l’exis-
tence précède le colonialisme. L’emplacement paradoxal de l’exploitation minière
artisanale et son intrication dans le temps nous invitent à nous interroger sur cer-
taines manières dont les chercheurs ont interprété la précarité non seulement
comme une condition politiquement induite résultant du néolibéralisme, mais
également comme une conséquence de la nature persistante de la structure colo-
nisante en Afrique.
805Artisanal miners in Congo
